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Writings on the Form and Structure of the Published Law*
Richard	A.	Danner**
Robert C. Berring’s writings about the impacts of electronic databases, the 
Internet, and other communications technologies on legal research and prac-
tice are an essential part of a larger literature that explores the ways in which 
the forms and structures of published legal information have influenced how 
American lawyers think about the law. Professor Danner reviews Berring’s 
writings, along with those of other writers concerned with these questions, 
focusing on the implications of Berring’s idea that in the late nineteenth cen-
tury American legal publishers created a “conceptual universe of thinkable 
thoughts” through which U.S. lawyers came to view the law. He concludes 
that, spurred by Berring and others, the literature of legal information has 
become far-reaching in scope and interdisciplinary in approach, while the 








on	 legal	 research	and	 the	 legal	publishing	 industry	may	have	been	written	 less	 to	
construct	a	model	for	the	role	of	legal	information	in	American	legal	culture	than	
to	examine	 the	effects	of	 those	changes	on	 the	modern	 legal	 information	 system.	
But,	by	basing	his	commentary	on	the	impacts	of	technological	change	in	the	late	
twentieth	century	in	a	historical	discussion	of	the	legal	information	systems	that	had	




	 **	 Rufty	Research	Professor	of	Law	and	Senior	Associate	Dean	for	 Information	Services,	Duke	Law	
School,	Durham,	North	Carolina.
	 1.	 Robert	C.	Berring,	Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority,	88	Cal. l. Rev. 1673,	
1676	 (2000)	 [hereinafter	 Berring,	Cognitive Authority].	 Berring	 explained	 this	 lack	 of	 interest	 in	
part	as	a	reflection	of	how	well	the	legal	information	system	has	worked,	and	on	general	agreement	
in	the	legal	culture	to	confer	cognitive,	or	trusted,	authority	on	a	small	set	of	legal	sources.	Id.	See 
also Steven	M.	Barkan,	Book	Review,	10	n. ill. U. l. Rev.	365,	365	(1990)	(reviewing	M. ethan 
Katsh, the eleCtRoniC Media and the tRansFoRMation oF law (1989))	(“This	dearth	of	activity	
is	particularly	troublesome	because	of	the	intimate	relationship	that	exists	between	law	and	its	infor-
mational	sources.”).
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¶2	Berring	emphasized	 the	historical	 role	of	 the	West	Publishing	Company,	 the	
preeminent	publisher	of	American	law,	suggesting	that	West’s	comprehensive	publish-










System	on	how	American	 lawyers	 understand	 and	 think	 about	 the	 law;	 and	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 the	 conceptual	 universe	 was	 “closed,”	 limiting	 the	 acceptable	
sources	of	 law	 to	published	cases—in	practical	 terms,	 to	cases	published	 in	 the	
West	 National	 Reporter	 System.	 The	 article	 first	 attempts	 to	 identify	 the	 key	
	 2.	 The	usual	starting	point	for	considering	the	role	of	paradigms	in	any	discipline	is	thoMas s. KUhn, 
the stRUCtURe oF sCientiFiC RevolUtions	 (3d	 ed.	1996).	For	Kuhn,	paradigms	“provide	models	
from	which	spring	particular	coherent	traditions	of	scientific	research.	.	 .	 .	[Those]	whose	research	
is	based	on	shared	paradigms	are	committed	to	the	same	rules	and	standards	for	scientific	practice.	
That	commitment	and	the	apparent	consensus	it	produces	are	prerequisites	for	.	 .	 .	 the	genesis	and	
continuation	of	a	particular	research	tradition.”	Id.	at	11.	
	 	 	 For	 discussions	 of	 paradigms	 for	 legal	 information	 and	 legal	 research,	 see	 Carol	 M.	 Bast	 &	
Ransford	C.	 Pyle,	Legal Research in the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift,	 93	law libR. J. 285,	
286–89,	2001	law libR. J.	13,	¶¶	5–14;	Barbara	Bintliff,	Context and Legal Research,	99	law libR. 
J. 249,	254–57,	2007	law libR. J.	15,	¶¶	22–32;	F.	Allan	Hanson,	From Key Numbers to Keywords: 
How Automation Has Transformed the Law,	94	law libR. J. 563,	564,	2002	law libR. J.	36,	¶	2	
[hereinafter	Hanson,	From Key Numbers to Keywords].	Berring	discussed	old	 and	new	paradigms	
of	 legal	 research	 in	Robert	C.	Berring,	Full-Text Databases and Legal Research: Backing into the 
Future,	1 high teCh. l.J. 27	 (1986)	 [hereinafter	Berring,	Full-Text Databases],	 and	 occasionally	
employed	the	concept	in	later	articles.	See, e.g.,	Robert	C.	Berring,	Collapse of the Structure of the 
Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of Digital Information,	 69	wash. l. Rev. 9,	 27	 (1994)	
[hereinafter	Berring,	Collapse of the Structure]	(“[W]e	are	 in	 the	midst	of	a	major	paradigm	shift.	
Legal	information	is	out	of	control.”).	
	 3.	 Robert	C.	Berring,	Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts,	2	J. app. pRaC. & pRoCess 
305,	311	(2000)	[hereinafter	Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts].	
	 4.	 Id.
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Early Works: Focus on West












the	 late	nineteenth	century,	 the	development	of	 the	American	 legal	system	can	be	
seen	as	a	history	of	the	development	of	forms	of	legal	publication,”	and	the	question	
“whether	the	forms	of	publication	have	been	mere	vehicles	for	the	transmission	of	






of	American	 law,	particularly	 those	of	 the	publication,	classification,	and	 index-
ing	systems	devised	by	the	West	Publishing	Company	in	the	final	quarter	of	the	
nineteenth	century.11
	 6.	 Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	29.
	 7.	 Id.
	 8.	 Id.	at	29	n.9	(citing	haRvaRd law sChool ass’n, the Centennial histoRy oF the haRvaRd law 
sChool 1817–1917,	at	97	(1918)	(“The	library	is	to	us	what	the	laboratory	is	to	the	chemist	or	the	
physicist	and	what	the	museum	is	to	the	naturalist.”)).
	 9.	 Robert	C.	Berring,	Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance,	75	Cal. l. 
Rev. 15,	15	(1987)	[hereinafter	Berring,	Form Molds Substance].
	 10.	 Id.	at	15	n.1.
	 11.	 Berring’s	articles	also	discuss	the	role	of	Shepard’s Citations.	See, e.g., Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	
supra	 note	 1,	 at	 1695–96.	For	 a	 history	 of	 legal	 citators,	 see	Patti	Ogden,	Mastering the Lawless 
Science of Our Law: A Story of Legal Citation Indexes,	85	law libR. J.	1	(1993).
Law Library Journal [Vol.	99:2196
¶6	Berring’s	 early	articles	provide	a	 rich	history	of	West	 and	 the	 influences	
of	its	approaches	both	to	the	publication	and	organization	of	appellate	cases	and	
to	 indexing	 and	 digesting.12	 Already	 in	 1986,	 he	 noted	 that	 West’s	 American	










itself.”16	West	 had	 created	 a	 new	 form	 of	 legal	 literature	with	 its	 reporters	 and	
digests	in	the	late	1800s.	In	the	last	quarter	of	the	twentieth	century,	the	full-text	




¶7	 In	 1987,	 Berring	 moved	 his	 thoughts	 regarding	 the	 National	 Reporter	
System	and	 the	American	Digest	System	 into	a	broader	historical	discussion	of	









	 12.	 See, e.g.,	 Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 29–33.	See also eRwin C. sURRenCy, a 
histoRy oF aMeRiCan law pUblishing 237–42	(1990).	The	official	company	history	is	williaM w. 
MaRvin, west pUblishing CoMpany: oRigin, gRowth, leadeRship (1969).
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¶9	As	 Berring	 put	 it,	 “under	 the	 comprehensive	 model,	 the	 publication	 of	











at	the	middle	of	the	nineteenth	century.”	Id.	(citing	FRedeRiCK C. hiCKs, MateRials and Methods oF 
legal ReseaRCh with bibliogRaphiCal ManUal	111	(1923)	(Berring	cites	page	110.)).
	 22.	 Id.
	 23.	 Hicks	estimated	that	 there	were	nearly	3800	volumes	of	American	case	law	in	1885.	hiCKs,	supra	
note	21,	at	111.	







majority	of	practitioners,	 far	 from	academic	debates,	have	continued	 to	use	a	 research	system	that	
imposes	a	structure	of	organization	derived	from	the	grand	scheme.”	Id.	at	26.	
	 	 	 But	would	it	survive	the	print	era?	As	Berring	put	it,	“[T]he	ability	to	search	without	an	imposed	
structure	will	nakedly	expose	the	myth	of	the	common	law	and	the	beauty	of	the	seamless	web	to	







	 	 Robert	Berring,	Full Text Legal Research: Implications for the Future,	14 Call newsl./bUll. de l’ 
aCbd 186,	189	(1989).












¶11	Berring	 began	 by	 noting	 “the	 very	 special	way	 in	which	 legal	 thinkers	
and	legal	practitioners	have	viewed	published	legal	materials,”	the	“almost	mysti-























	 31.	 Berring,	Collapse of the Structure,	supra	note	2.
	 32.	 Id.	at	10.
	 33.	 Id.






























	 39.	 Perhaps	 the	best	discussion	of	abridgements	 is	FRedeRiCK C. hiCKs, MateRials and Methods oF 
legal ReseaRCh with bibliogRaphiC ManUal 216–33	(2d.	rev.	&	enl.	ed.	1933)	[hereinafter	hiCKs 
(1933)].
	 40.	 See	 id.	at	196–97.	For	recent	research	on	the	uses	of	commonplace	books,	see	paUl M. pRUitt & 
david i. dURhaM, CoMMonplaCe booKs oF law: a seleCtion oF law-Related notebooKs FRoM 
the seventeenth CentURy to the Mid-twentieth CentURy (2005);	M.	H.	Hoeflich,	The Lawyer 
as Pragmatic Reader: The History of Legal Common-Placing,	55	aRK. l. Rev.	87	(2002).
	 41.	 See	A.W.B.	Simpson,	The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal 
Literature,	49	U. Chi. l. Rev. 632	(1981).
	 42.	 Berring,	Collapse of the Structure,	supra	note	2,	at	20.
	 43.	 Id.	at	21.
	 44.	 Id.	Berring	credits	Dan	Dabney	(currently	Senior	Director,	Thomson	Global	Services)	with	the	first	
application	of	the	term	to	legal	information.	See	id.	at	21	n.27;	Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts, supra 
note 3,	at	311	n.13.	See also	Daniel	Dabney,	The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: Literary Warrant 
and West’s Key Number System,	99	law libR. J.	229,	229,	2007	law libR J.	14,	¶	4.	
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Changes in the Information Environment
¶15	Between	1995	and	1997,	Berring	published	three	articles	written	against	the	
immediate	background	of	changes	in	the	legal	information	environment	prompted	
by	 the	 increasing	 concentration	 of	 ownership	 in	 legal	 publishing.	 “On	 Not	
Throwing	Out	the	Baby:	Planning	the	Future	of	Legal	Information,”49	published	in	
1995,	is	devoted	largely	to	arguments	that	market	forces,	rather	than	government	
initiatives,	 should	determine	 the	 future	 framework	of	 the	U.S.	 legal	 information	
system.	The	article	provided	insightful	commentary	on	West’s	systems,	but	did	not	
significantly	advance	the	themes	of	his	earlier	articles.50	
¶16	 Two	 years	 later,	 “Chaos,	 Cyberspace	 and	 Tradition:	 Legal	 Information	
Transmogrified”	 focused	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 changes	 in	 the	 corporate	 structure	








the	 influences	of	 the	company’s	standardized	case	 reporting	and	comprehensive	
coverage	on	American	jurisprudence.	Although	West	did	not	actually	publish	all	
decisions	 issued	by	American	appellate	courts,	 it	seemed	that	 it	did.	Only	 those	
decisions	that	were	published	in	West	reporters	“conveyed	‘reality’	to	a	decision	
.	.	.	.	[O]nly	when	a	case	appeared	in	the	West	system	did	it	become	real.”54	Written	
shortly	 after	West	 was	 acquired	 by	 the	Thomson	 Publishing	Group,	 the	 article	
outlined	 issues	 for	 a	 future	 in	which	 legal	 information	would	 be	 a	 commodity,	
less	distinguishable	 (perhaps	 indistinguishable)	 from	other	 information	 supplied	
electronically	by	the	conglomerate	companies	that	now	owned	West	and	the	other	
legal	 publishers.	 In	 the	 emerging	 legal	 information	 environment,	 where	 would	
lawyers	find	the	touchstones	of	stability	and	authority	that	West’s	publication	and	
organizing	systems	had	provided?	
	 49.	 Robert	C.	Berring,	On Not Throwing Out the Baby: Planning the Future of Legal Information,	83	




	 51.	 Robert	 C.	 Berring,	 Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal Information Transmogrified,	 12	

















¶18	 In	explanation	for	 the	breakdown	of	 the	old	universe,	Berring	noted	 the	
effects	 of	 Thomson’s	 acquisition	 of	 the	West	 Publishing	 Company,57	 but	 also	
law	students’	and	young	 lawyers’	growing	reliance	on	computer-based	research.	
“[T]here	 is	now	 ten	years	worth	of	 law	students	who	have	graduated	with	 little	







perhaps	Berring’s	most	 thorough	elaboration	of	his	 ideas	 regarding	 the	place	of	
West’s	 digest	 system	 in	 the	 conceptual	 universe	 that	 dominated	American	 legal	
thinking	until	“[t]echnology	.	.	.	invaded	the	world	of	legal	information.”59	Relying	
on	Geoffrey	Bowker	and	Susan	Star’s	recent	book	on	the	effects	of	classification,	







¶20	 In	 law,	 what	 Berring	 called	 the	 “confluence”	 of	 the	 structure	 pre-
sented	 by	 Blackstone	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 the	 curriculum	 of	 modern	 legal	





	 59.	 Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts,	supra	note	3,	at	311.
	 60.	 Id.	 at	 310	 n.11	 (citing	 geoFFRey C. bowKeR & sUsan leigh staR, soRting things oUt: 
ClassiFiCation and its ConseqUenCes (1999)	 for	 its	 discussion	of	 “determinative	 power	 of	 clas-
sification	systems”).	
	 61.	 Id.	at	310.









thoughts.	 “Rather	 than	 having	 legal	 information	 shape	 their	 perceptions	 of	 the	
world,	 they	are	shaping	 legal	 information	 to	 their	existing	 information	world.”63	
As	a	result,	“the	old	classification	system	of	West	topic	and	key	numbers	.	.	.	no	
longer	 define	 the	 reality	 of	 legal	 thinking.”64	 In	 addition,	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	
legal	information	universe	were	shifting,	both	through	the	habits	of	a	new	genera-
tion	of	 legal	 researchers	accustomed	 to	using	electronic	search	 tools	 throughout	
their	 professional	 (and	 personal)	 lives,	 and	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 ownership	 of	
companies	that	published	legal	information.	The	intrusion	into	the	legal	informa-
tion	market	of	large	multinational	companies	with	wide-ranging	subject	interests	
meant	that	“[w]hat	once	was	a bright-line border between	legal	information	and	





¶23	The	 series	of	 articles	 culminated	 in	 the	California Law Review	 in	2000	





and	 legal	 authority.67	 Throughout	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 legal	 information	 was	







	 63.	 Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts,	supra	note	3,	at	313.
	 64.	 Id.	at	314.
	 65.	 Id.	at	311	(emphasis	added).	Berring	pointed	out	that	this	was	not	simply	a	matter	of	the	differences	





	 67.	 Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	supra	note	1,	at	1676.
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sources	cited	 in	an	1899	volume	of	United States Reports and	 those	 in	a	single	
U.S.	Supreme	Court	opinion	published	in	1999	in	U.S. Law Week.70	After	noting	
that	 the	 range	 of	 subjects	 addressed	 in	 each	 year	 is	 similar	 enough	 to	 support	
comparison	of	what	source	materials	are	cited,	Berring	found	that	the	1899	Court	
cited	to	judicial	reports	(predominately),	to	legislation,	and	in	a	few	instances	to	












	 70.	 Id.	 at	 1683–91.	 Studies	 of	 sources	 cited	 in	 judicial	 opinions,	 especially	 the	 opinions	 of	 the	 U.S.	
Supreme	Court,	are	fairly	common	in	the	legal	research	literature,	particularly	since	the	availability	






easily	seen,	for	all	there	is	to	see.”	Karl	N.	Llewellyn,	Legal Tradition and Social Science Method—A 
Realist’s Critique,	 in	essays on ReseaRCh in the soCial sCienCes 89,	95–96	(1931),	reprinted in 
KaRl n. llewellyn, JURispRUdenCe: RealisM in theoRy and pRaCtiCe 77,	82	(1962).	Berring	does	
not	discuss	Llewellyn.
	 	 	 For	an	argument	that	the	increased	availability	and	distribution	of	congressional	documents	was	one	
reason	for	the	increased	citation	by	U.S.	courts	of	legislative	history	materials	in	the	interpretation	of	
statutes	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	see	Richard	A.	Danner,	Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical 
and Comparative Perspectives on the Availability of Legislative History,	dUKe J. CoMp. & int’l l.,	
Summer	2003,	at	151.
	 73.	 Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	supra	note	1,	at	1687	(“The	myth	of	the	common	law	as	a	beautifully	
constructed,	logically	consistent,	ptolemaic	system	of	unwritten	law	was	still	strong.”).
	 74.	 Id.	 at	 1688	 (citing	Muller	 v.	Oregon,	 208	U.S.	 412	 (1908)).	 For	 discussion	 of	 the	 impacts	 of	 the	
Brandeis	brief,	see	John w. Johnson, aMeRiCan legal CUltURe, 1908–1940,	at	29–51	(1981).	



















¶27	 The	 organizing	 system	 for	 the	 database	 of	 published	 cases	 was	 the	
American	 Digest	 System,	 “a	 precoordinated	 index	 that	 covered	 every	 possible	
legal	situation.	.	.	.	The	Digest	System	organized	each	case	that	passed	through	the	
National	Reporter	System	into	a	predetermined	set	of	categories.	.	.	.	Generations	











	 78.	 Id.	at	1691	(citing	Frederick	Schauer	&	Virginia	J.	Wise,	Legal Positivism as Legal Information,	82	
CoRnell l. Rev. 1080	 (1997)	 [hereinafter	Schauer	&	Wise,	Legal Positivism];	Frederick	Schauer	
&	Virginia	 J.	Wise,	Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law,	 29	 J. legal stUd. 495	
(2000)	[hereinafter	Schauer	&	Wise,	Nonlegal Information]).	For	discussion	of	the	Schauer	and	Wise	
articles,	see	infra	notes	171–78	and	accompanying	text.
	 79.	 See	Berring,	Collapse of the Structure,	supra	note	2,	at	16–23.





















for	 legal	 research	 was	 not	 the	 cause—initially	 at	 least	 Lexis	 and	Westlaw	 had	
“aped	the	functions	of	the	old	system.”87	Instead,	he	focused	on	three	other	factors:	
a	new	environment	in	which	users	of	legal	information	had	always	worked	with	
electronic	 information	 sources;	 the	 consolidation	 of	 legal	 publishers	 into	 large	
corporate	entities	 that	viewed	 legal	 information	as	a	commodity	similar	 to	 their	
other	 information	products;	and	 the	 Internet,	which	would	destroy	 the	cognitive	
authority	of	the	National	Reporter	System.88	
¶30	The	 article	 and	 the	 series	 closed	with	what	 Berring	 called	 a	 “sermon,”	
summarizing	the	deleterious	effects	of	the	breakdown	of	the	one-hundred-year-old	






tion	was	a	topic.	Several	of	the	cases	focus	on	statutes.”);	Berring,	Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition,	
supra	 note	 51,	 at	 192	n.9	 (“Only	 in	 recent	 years	 have	 statutes	 and	 administrative	 codes	grown	 in	
influence.”).	
	 	 	 William	Popkin	has	argued,	however,	that	legislation	was	an	important	source	of	law	in	the	states	
throughout	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 and	 that	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 legislation	 at	 the	 national	
level	in	the	last	quarter	of	the	century	was	indicated	by	events	such	as	the	first	codification	of	federal	
law,	the	Revised Statutes of the United States (published	in	1874),	and	the	first	official	publication	
of	congressional	debates	in	the	Congressional Record in	1873.	See	williaM d. popKin, statUtes in 
CoURt 60–61	(1999).	Others	have	pointed	out	the	growth	in	legislative	activity	during	the	last	quarter	
of	the	nineteenth	century.	See, e.g.,	gRant gilMoRe, the ages oF aMeRiCan law 63	(1977)	(noting	
that	in	the	post-Civil	War	period	“[t]he	legislatures,	stirred	by	populist	discontents,	experimented	with	
social	legislation—regulating	the	hours	and	conditions	of	employment,	restricting	the	exploitation	of	
women	and	children,	and	so	on.”); JaMes willaRd hURst, law and soCial oRdeR in the United 
states 36	 (1977)	 (“From	 the	1880’s,	 but	most	markedly	 from	 the	 take-off	 decade	of	 1905–1915,	
the	 regulatory	component	of	statute	 law	became	much	more	prominent	and	added	considerably	 to	
the	volume	of	legislation.	.	.	.”).	See generally	JaMes willaRd hURst, law and the Conditions oF 
FReedoM in the nineteenth CentURy United states 71–108	(1956).
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marketplace	deliver	 legal	 information	 enhanced	with	 the	value	 added	under	 the	
old	regime.90	
Other Writers
¶31	Berring’s	first	major	writings	on	 the	role	of	 legal	 information	appeared	as	a	
few	other	writers	were	also	beginning	to	consider	the	issues	raised	for	the	devel-
opment	 and	 practice	 of	 the	 law	 by	 new	 information	 technologies.	 For	most	 of	
the	 twentieth	century,	 the	 literature	of	 legal	 information91	had	dealt	mostly	with	
legal	research	and	bibliography—how	to	find	the	law	and	how	to	teach	law	stu-
dents	how	to	 find	 the	 law	(what	should	be	 taught,	how	it	 should	be	 taught,	and	
by	whom).92	In	the	1960s,	the	continuing	growth	in	the	amount	of	published	legal	
information	prompted	what	Bernard	Hibbits	called	“an	eclectic	variety	of	lawyers,	
legal	 academics,	 and	 law	 librarians	 [to	 look]	 to	 emerging	 computer	 technology	
to	facilitate	the	storage,	accessing,	and	distribution	of	legal	information.”93	A	lit-
	 90.	 Id.	at	1708.
	 91.	 The	term	“legal	information”	was	itself	seldom	used.	The	author’s	search	of	the	files	for Law Library 
Journal	 in	the	HeinOnline	database	suggests	that	the	term	appeared	in	forty	articles	between	1908	
and	1985,	but	in	thirty-five	articles	between	1986	and	2005. See generally	neil postMan, bUilding 
a bRidge to the eighteenth CentURy: how the past Can iMpRove oUR FUtURe	82–98	(1999)	for	
explorations	of	how	recently	it	is	that	we	have	started	thinking	about	“information”	as	a	concept,	as	
something	that	could	be	thought	about	apart	from	its	substantive	context.	
	 92.	 The	 legal	 research	 and	 bibliography	 literature	 began	 with	 the	 works	 of	 law	 book	 salesmen	 and	
a	 few	 law	 librarians	 at	 the	 turn	of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 and	extends	 through	 the	 era	of	 the	great	
legal	research	textbooks	to	the	present	time.	For	a	thorough	and	insightful	bibliographic	history	of	
American	legal	research	texts,	see	Steven	M.	Barkan,	On Describing Legal Research,	80	MiCh. l. 
Rev. 925	 (1982)	 [hereinafter	Barkan,	On Describing Legal Research].	For	a	brief	history	of	 legal	
research	instruction,	see	Joyce	Manna	Janto	&	Lucinda	D.	Harrison-Cox,	Teaching Legal Research: 
Past and Present,	84	law libR. J.	281,	282–89	(1992).	For	more	recent	literature,	see	generally Law 
Library Journal	 (1908–),	Legal Reference Services Quarterly	 (1981–),	and	Perspectives: Teaching 
Legal Research and Writing	(1992–).	Most	issues	of	Perspectives	also	list	recent	books	and	articles	
on	research	and	writing.
	 	 	 Berring	 himself	 has	 been	 a	 frequent	 writer,	 commentator,	 and	 innovator	 on	 matters	 of	 legal	
research	instruction.	See e.g.,	Robert	C.	Berring	&	Kathleen	Vanden	Heuvel,	Legal Research: Should 
Students Learn It or Wing It?	81	law libR. J.	431	(1989);	Robert	C.	Berring	&	Kathleen	Vanden	
Heuvel,	Legal Research: A Final Response,	82	law libR. J.	495	(1990);	Robert	C.	Berring,	A Sort 
of Response: Brutal Non-Choices,	4	peRspeCtives: teaChing legal Res. & wRiting 81	(1996).	For	
commentary	on	these	works	within	the	the	context	of	the	pedagogical	debates	of	their	time,	see	Paul	
Douglas	Callister,	Beyond Training: Law Librarianship’s Quest for the Pedagogy of Legal Research 
Education,	95	law libR. J.	7,	9–22,	2003	law libR. J.	1,	¶¶	5–35.	For	a	general	bibliography	on	
Berring’s	writings,	 including	 those	 on	 legal	 research	 instruction,	 see	 Frank	G.	Houdek,	From the 
Reference Desk to River City: A Bibliography of the Writings of Robert C. Berring,	99	law libR. J. 
413,	2007	law libR. J.	24. 
	 93.	 Bernard	J. Hibbitts,	Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace,	71	n.y.U. 
l. Rev.	615,	655	(1996).	For	useful	background	on	these	early	efforts,	see id.	at	654–57;	Jon	Bing,	
Performance of Legal Text Retrieval Systems: The Curse of Boole,	 79	law libR. J.	 187,	 187–89	
(1987);	Samuel	E.	Trosow,	The Database and the Fields of Law: Are There New Divisions of Labor?	
96	law libR. J.	63,	66–69,	2004	law libR. J.	5,	¶¶	13–18.	For	an	early	review	of	the	uses	of	comput-
ers	in	legal	research,	see	William	B.	Eldridge	&	Sally	F.	Dennis,	The Computer As a Tool for Legal 
Research,	28	law & ConteMp. pRobs. 78	(1963).
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erature	on	computer-assisted	legal	research	(CALR)	tools	began	to	develop	after	
the	widespread	 introduction	of	Lexis	 and	Westlaw	 in	 the	mid-1970s.94	 Initially,	
much	of	that	literature	described	the	benefits	and	shortcomings	of	the	new	CALR	
systems	 as	 research	 tools.95	 From	 the	mid-1980s	 on,	 however,	 the	 literature	 of	
legal	research	and	legal	 information	began	to	shift	away	from	these	initial	 takes	








“Communications	Revolutions	 and	Legal	Revolutions:	The	New	Media	 and	 the	









of	 commercially	 available	CALR	 systems	 in	 the	United	 States	 is	William	G.	Harrington,	A Brief 
History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research,	77	law libR. J. 543	(1984–85).	The	literature	about	
the	uses	of	computers	for	legal	research	is	well	tracked	in	bibliographies	published	(usually	annually)	
in	the	Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal	(1970–)	(title	varies).
	 95.	 See, e.g.,	Robert	C.	Berring,	Terminal Awareness,	Cal. law.,	Nov.	1985	at	15;	Scott	F.	Burson,	Report 
from the Electronic Trenches: An Update on Computer-Assisted Legal Research,	legal ReFeRenCe 
seRviCes q.,	Summer	1984,	at	3;	William	G.	Harrington,	H.	Donald	Wilson	&	Robert	L.	Bennett,	
The Mead Data Central System of Computerized Legal Research,	64	law libR. J. 184	(1971);	Online 
Information Retrieval for the Legal Profession: A Panel,	70	law libR. J. 532	(1977);	John	T.	Soma	&	
Andrea	R.	Stern, A Survey of Computerized Information for Lawyers: LEXIS, JURIS, WESTLAW and 
FLITE,	9	RUtgeRs CoMpUteR & teCh. l.J. 295	(1983);	James	A.	Sprowl,	Computer-Assisted Legal 
Research—An Analysis of Full-Text Document Retrieval Systems, Particularly the LEXIS System,	
1976	aM. b. FoUnd. Res. J.	175;	James	A.	Sprowl,	The WESTLAW System—A Different Approach to 
Computer-Assisted Legal Research,	16	JURiMetRiCs J.	142	(1976).
	 96.	 Writing	on	legal	research	instruction	did	not	stop,	but	there	was	perhaps	greater	focus	on	the	effects	
of	access	to	computer-assisted	legal	research	systems	on	students’	and	new	associates’	research	skills.	
See, e.g.,	Donald	J.	Dunn,	Why Legal Research Skills Declined, or When Two Rights Make a Wrong,	
85	law libR. J. 49	(1993);	 Joan	S.	Howland	&	Nancy	J.	Lewis,	The Effectiveness of Law School 
Legal Research Training Programs,	40	J. legal edUC. 381	(1990).
	 97.	 M.	Ethan	Katsh,	Communications Revolutions and Legal Revolutions: The New Media and the Future 
of Law,	8	nova l. J. 631	(1984).
	 98.	 Id.	at	638.	Katsh	noted,	however,	that	“[l]aw	librarians	seem	much	more	sensitive	than	legal	historians	
to	the	influences	of	printing	on	law.”	Id.	at	638	n.23.






























	 100.	 Id.	at	645–46	(citing	Howard	Jay	Graham	&	John	W.	Heckel,	The Book that ‘Made’ the Common 










	 104.	 Ethan	Katsh,	Digital Lawyers: Orienting the Legal Profession to Cyberspace,	55	U. pitt. l. Rev. 
1141	(1994);	Ethan	Katsh,	Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace,	38	vill. l. 
Rev.	403	(1993)	[hereinafter	Katsh,	Digital World];	Ethan	Katsh,	The Law Librarian as Paratrooper,	
83	law libR. J. 627	(1991).
	 105.	 M. ethan Katsh, the eleCtRoniC Media and the tRansFoRMation oF law	 (1989)	 [hereinafter	
Katsh, eleCtRoniC Media];	M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital woRld (1995)	[hereinafter	Katsh, 
law in a digital woRld].



























	 110.	 See e.g.,	 Barkan,	 supra	 note	 1;	 Morris	 L.	 Cohen,	 Research in a Changing World of Law and 
Technology, 13 dalhoUsie l. J. 5,	 8–9,	 18 (1990);	 Bruce	A.	Markell, Digital Demons and Lost 
Lawyers,	48	Fed. CoMM. l. J. 545	(1996)	(reviewing	M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital woRld 
(1995));	Nazareth	A.	M.	Pantaloni,	III,	Legal Databases, Legal Epistemology, and the Legal Order,	
86	 law libR. J. 679	 (1994);	 Richard	 J.	 Ross,	 Communications Revolutions and Legal Culture: 
An Elusive Relationship,	 27	law & soC. inqUiRy 637	 (2002)	 (reviewing	M. ethan Katsh, the 
eleCtRoniC Media and the tRansFoRMation oF law (1989); M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital 
woRld (1995);	Ronald	K.L.	Collins	&	David	M.	Skover,	Paratexts,	44	stan. l. Rev. 509	(1992));	
Pamela	Samuelson, The Quest for Enabling Metaphors for Law and Lawyering in the Information 
Age,	94	MiCh. l. Rev.	2029	(1996)	(reviewing	M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital woRld (1995);	
JaMes boyle, shaMans, soFtwaRe, and spleens: law and the ConstRUCtion oF the inFoRMation 
soCiety (1996));	Eugene	Volokh,	Technology and the Future of Law,	47	stan. l. Rev.	1375	(1995)	
(reviewing	M. ethan Katsh, law in a digital woRld (1995)).	
	 	 	 Other	work	examining	the	effects	of	media,	old	and	new,	on	the	law	included	Ronald	K.L.	Collins	
&	David	M.	Skover,	Paratexts,	44	stan. l. Rev. 509	(1992);	Bernard	J.	Hibbitts, Coming to Our 
Senses: Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures,	41 eMoRy l.J.	873	(1992);	
Molly	Warner	Lien,	Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer,	48	aM. U. l. Rev.	86	
(1998);	Peter	W.	Martin,	The Internet: Full and Unfettered Access to Law—Some Implications,	26	n. 
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in	areas	beyond	law	to	argue	that	“[w]hile	legal	indexes	may	have	influenced	the	




Computer-Based Searching and the Digest
¶36	 Dan	 Dabney’s	 “The	 Curse	 of	 Thamus:	 An	 Analysis	 of	 Full-Text	 Legal	
Document	 Retrieval,”	 published	 in	 1986,114	 also	 preceded	Berring’s	 first	major	
writings	 on	 the	 influences	 of	 legal	 information.	Although	 he	 said	 little	 directly	
about	 digests	 and	other	 traditional	 print-based	 tools,	Dabney	provided	 a	 frame-
work	for	evaluating	the	effectiveness	of	full-text	document	retrieval	systems	in	law	
that	could	be	used	to	compare	them	with	print	indexes	and	digests.115
¶37	A	first	response	to	the	issues	raised	in	Berring’s	High Technology Law 
Review article	appeared	in	Scott	Burson’s	1987	critique	of	Dabney’s	article.116	
Burson	acknowledged	the	importance	of	Dabney’s	focus	on	“a	question	central	
to	 legal	research	and	legal	bibliography:	how	do	we	evaluate	our	 legal	 infor-
mation	retrieval	 tools?”	and	cited	Dabney’s	use	of	 the	concepts	of	relevance,	
recall,	 precision,	 and	 fallout,	 which	 provide	 a	 “framework	 [that]	 applies	
equally	 to	conventional	and	computer-assisted	information	retrieval	 tools.”117	
Burson	also	 attempted	 to	move	Dabney’s	 concerns	 into	 the	 areas	 considered	
by	Berring.	
¶38	 Burson	 questioned	 Dabney’s	 assertion	 that	American	 lawyers	 require	
high	 recall—a	 high	 percentage	 of	 relevant	 documents—in	 their	 research.118	
	 112.	 Id.	at	698–99.	
	 113.	 Id.	at	700	(citing	lloyd a. FalleRs, law withoUt pReCedent 35	(1969)).






ing	David	Blair	&	M.E.	Maron,	An Evaluation of Retrieval Effectiveness for a Full-Text Document 
Retrieval System,	 28	CoMM. aCM	 289	 (1985)).	The	 influences	of	Dabney’s	 article	were	 apparent	
in	 later	attempts	 to	evaluate	 the	effectiveness	of	digests	and	other	 legal	research	tools.	Particularly	
important	examples	include	John	Doyle,	WESTLAW and the American Digest Classification System,	
84	 law libR. J. 229	 (1992);	 Ogden,	 supra	 note	 11;	 Marilyn	 R.	Walter,	 Retaking Control over 
Teaching Research,	43	J. legal edUC. 569,	572–80	(1993).	See also	Fritz	Snyder,	The West Digest 
System: The Ninth Circuit and the Montana Supreme Court,	60 Mont. l. Rev.	541	(1999);	Lee	F.	
Peoples,	The Death of the Digest and the Pitfalls of Electronic Research: What is the Modern Legal 
Researcher to Do?	97	law libR. J. 661,	2005	law libR. J.	41.
	 116.	 Scott	F.	Burson,	A Reconstruction of Thamus: Comments on the Evaluation of Legal Information 
Retrieval Systems,	79	law libR. J. 133	(1987).
	 117.	 Id.	at	133.	For	definitions	of	the	concepts,	see	Dabney,	supra	note	114,	at	14–17.
	 118.	 Burson,	supra	note	116,	at	136	(“Dabney	asserts,	ipse dixit,	that	legal	research	tools	should	aim	for	
high	 recall.”).	See	Dabney,	supra	 note	114,	 at	16	 (“The	adversary	 system	of	American	 law	puts	a	
high	 premium	on	 exhaustiveness	 in	 case	 research	 and	 thus	 needs	 retrieval	 systems	 that	maximize	
recall.”).	
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Rather	 than	 seeing	 “every	 single	 arguably	 relevant	 case	 when	 doing	 legal	
research	.	 .	 .	we	would	like	to	focus	our	efforts	on	the	heart	of	an	issue.”119	In	




would	be	precoordinated	 indexes	 such	as	 those	 employed	 in	 the	West	digests.	
Dabney	had	identified	the	limitations	of	digest	searching	whether	the	researcher	






Burson	 engaged	 that	 discussion,	 using	Berring’s	 piece	 and	 an	 earlier	 article	
by	 Rita	 Reusch125	 in	 a	 nuanced	 examination	 of	 how	 lawyers	 determine	 the	
“relevance”	of	cases	and	other	information	to	the	resolution	of	legal	problems.	
While	Dabney’s	idea	of	relevance	was	tied	closely	to	his	concerns	with	matters	
of	 searching	 and	measurable	 attributes	 such	 as	 recall	 and	 precision,	 Burson	





issue,	 for	 the	 novel	 and	 analogous	 rather	 than	 for	 the	 accepted	 treatment	 of	
an	issue.”126	Having	earlier	cited	Berring	as	authority	for	the	influence	of	the	












	 124.	 Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	34–37.
	 125.	 Rita	Reusch,	The Search for Analogous Legal Authority: How to Find it When You Don’t Know What 
You’re Looking For?	legal ReFeRenCe seRviCes q.,	Fall	1984,	at	33.
	 126.	 Burson,	supra	note	116,	at	143	n.25	(citing	Reusch,	supra	note	125).
	 127.	 Id.	at	143	n.25	(citing	Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	31–33).
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of	 the	comments	spawned	by	Dabney’s	article.128	They	were	essential,	however,	
to	 the	 next	 burst	 of	 writing	 on	 the	 influences	 of	 legal	 information,	 a	 series	 of	
articles	applying	and	responding	to	the	use	of	the	tools	of	Critical	Legal	Studies	
(CLS)	to	 the	process	of	 legal	research.	In	1987,	Steve	Barkan	published	in	Law 
Library Journal an	 article	 suggesting	 how	 a	 CLS	 critique	might	 be	 applied	 to	
legal	research.129	The	following	year,	Virginia	Wise	published	an	introduction	to	
CLS	for	librarians	in	Legal Reference Services Quarterly,130	and	in	1989	Richard	
Delgado	 and	 Jean	 Stefancic	 used	 critical	 perspectives	 to	 analyze	 the	 impacts	





CLS-related	concepts	 to	 legal	research,	 including	“the	nature	and	effects	of	cat-
egorizing	legal	problems,”136	matters	that	Berring	was	beginning	to	consider	in	his	
work.137	Barkan	defined	 legal	 research	as	“the	pragmatic,	goal-oriented	practice	





services.	See	Jo	McDermott,	Another Analysis of Full-Text Legal Document Retrieval,	78	law libR. 
J.	337	(1986)	(McDermott	was	Product	Information	Manager,	Mead	Data	Central);	Craig	E.	Runde	
&	William	H.	Lindberg,	The	Curse	of	Thamus: A Response,	78	law libR. J.	345	(1986)	(Runde	was	
Marketing,	Special	 Projects,	West	Pub.	Co.;	Lindberg,	Westlaw	Administrator,	West	Pub.	Co.);	 as	
well	as	Dabney’s	rejoinder,	Daniel	P.	Dabney,	A Reply to West Publishing Company and Mead Data 
Central on The	Curse	of	Thamus,	78	law libR. J.	349	(1986).	See also Bing,	supra	note	93	(trac-
ing	some	of	the	history	of	full-text	information	retrieval	in	law	and	probing	Dabney’s	discussion	of	
relevance	and	recall,	but	not	broaching	the	issues	being	raised	by	Berring).
	 129.	 Steven	M.	Barkan,	Deconstructing Legal Research: A Law Librarian’s Commentary on Critical Legal 
Studies,	79	law libR. J. 617	(1987)	[hereinafter	Barkan,	Deconstructing Legal Research].
	 130.	 Virginia	 Wise,	 Of Lizards, Intersubjective Zap, and Trashing: Critical Legal Studies and the 
Librarian,	legal ReFeRenCe seRviCes q.,	1988,	no.	1–2,	at	7.	Wise’s	essay	and	bibliography	intro-
duced	the	major	themes	of	Critical	Legal	Studies	and	identified	the	primary	writers.	
	 131.	 Richard	 Delgado	 &	 Jean	 Stefancic,	 Why Do We Tell the Same Stories: Law Reform, Critical 
Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma?	42	stan. l. Rev. 207	(1989).	See also	Jean	Stefancic	
&	Richard	Delgado,	Outsider Jurisprudence and the Electronic Revolution: Will Technology Help or 
Hinder the Cause of Law Reform? 52	ohio state l. J. 847,	853–54	(1991).
	 132.	 Peter	 C.	 Schanck,	 Taking Up Barkan’s Challenge: Looking at the Judicial Process and Legal 
Research,	82	law libR. J. 1	(1990).
	 133.	 Steven	M.	Barkan,	Response to Schanck: On the Need for Critical Law Librarianship, or Are We All 
Legal Realists Now?	82	law libR. J. 23	(1990)	[hereinafter	Barkan,	Response to Schanck].
	 134.	 Peter	C.	Schanck,	The Last Word (I Hope),	82	law libR. J. 37	(1990).
	 135.	 Barkan,	On Describing Legal Research,	supra	note	92.
	 136.	 Barkan,	Deconstructing Legal Research,	supra	note	129,	at	618.
	 137.	 See	Berring,	Form Molds Substance,	supra	note	9,	at	25.
	 138.	 Barkan, Deconstructing Legal Research,	supra	note	129,	at	621.	See id. for	discussion	of	the	distinctions	
between	“practice	research”	and	the	scholarly	research	undertaken	by	law	professors	and	others.




















research	sources	affects	 its	 interpretation	and	results	 in	a	form	of	‘bibliographic	
determinism.’.	 .	 .	Key	numbers,	 indexes,	 annotations,	 footnotes	 and	 cross-refer-
ences	set	the	limits	of	inquiry;	they	‘narrow	the	window’	so	to	speak.”145	Barkan	
suggested	 that	 we	 should	 look	more	 closely	 at	 the	 relationships	 between	 legal	
resources	and	the	substantive	development	of	the	law,	then	cited	Berring	and	oth-
ers	for	“solid	claims	 that	West	helped	shape	 the	nature	of	American	 law.”146	He	
also	quoted	Berring’s	statement	that	“in	law,	more	than	any	other	discipline,	the	
structure	of	the	literature	implies	the	structure	of	the	enterprise	itself.”147
	 139.	 Id.	at	619–20	(citing	definitions	in	MoRRis l. Cohen & RobeRt C. beRRing, how to Find the law 
2	(8th	ed.	1983);	J. MyRon JaCobstein & Roy M. MeRsKy, FUndaMentals oF legal ReseaRCh 6	






	 142.	 Id.	at	631	(quoting	Duncan	Kennedy,	The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries,	28	bUFF. l. Rev.	
209,	215	(1979)).
	 143.	 Id.
	 144.	 Id.	at	632	n.74	(citing	Peter	Gabel,	Reification in Legal Reasoning,	in	MaRxisM and law 262,	263	
(Piers	Beirne	&	Richard	Quinney	eds.,	1982)).
	 145.	 Id.	at	632.	In	support,	Barkan	cited	Llewellyn’s	idea	of	the	“threat	of	the	available.”	Id.	n.77	(citing	
KaRl n. llewellyn, JURispRUdenCe: RealisM in theoRy and pRaCtiCe 82	(1962)).	On	the	“threat	
of	the	available,”	see	supra	note	72.
	 146.	 Id.	 at	 633	 (citing	gilMoRe,	 supra	 note	 85,	 at	 58–59;	MaRtin MayeR, the lawyeRs 431	 (1967);	
RobeRt b. stevens, law sChool: legal edUCation in aMeRiCa FRoM the 1850s to the 1980s, at 
132–33	(1983);	Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	32–33,	33–34,	36).
	 147.	 Id.	at	633–34	(citing	Berring,	Full-Text Databases,	supra	note	2,	at	29).







He	 closed	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	 established	 “simplistic,	 outdated,	 formalistic	





focus	on	the	 influences	of	categories	 in	 their	Stanford Law Review essay,	“Why	
Do	We	Tell	 the	 Same	 Stories?”	which	 analyzed	 the	 constraining	 effects	 of	 the	
categories	employed	in	the	standard	legal	research	indexing	systems:	the	Library	
of	 Congress	 Subject	 Headings,	 legal	 periodical	 indexes,	 and	 the	 West	 Digest	
System.150	Focusing	 first	on	 the	headings	used	 in	periodical	 indexes	and	by	 the	
Library	 of	 Congress,	 Delgado	 and	 Stefancic	 noted	 the	 commonalities	 in	 the	
sources	used	to	establish	headings	in	the	indexes:
The	Index to Legal Periodicals lists	Black’s Law Dictionary (published	by	West)	and	West’s	
Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary as	sources	of	authority	for	its	subject	headings.	Current Law 
Index is	based	on	Library	of	Congress	subject	headings	with	modifications.	The	Library	of	







into	a	rigid	grand	scheme	into which the law itself had to be fit.”154
	 148.	 Id.	at	635.





they	both	 facilitate	 traditional	 legal	 thought	and	constrain	novel	 approaches	 to	 the	 law.”).	Virginia	
Wise’s	1988	introduction	to	Critical	Legal	Studies	for	law	librarians	had	pointed	out	that	“the	primary	
obstacle	 to	 locating	material	about	CLS	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 subject	 heading	 access”	 in	 both	 periodical	
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¶46	Acknowledging	 that	 the	 classification	 systems	used	 in	 the	 legal	 indexes	
fulfill	 their	 intended	 purpose	 of	 helping	 researchers	 to	 locate	 relevant	 cases,	
articles,	and	books,	the	authors	pointed	out	that	these	systems	could	also	“create	





















	 l	 even	 if	 they	use	digests	exclusively,	 lawyers	 tend	 to	 look	at	 the	cases	 listed	







[s]ome	 never	 consult	 indexes,	 treatises,	 or	 finding	 aids.	 .	 .	 .	 For	 many	 lawyers,	 legal	
research	 is	no	more	 than	consulting	a	 jurisdiction-specific	subject	 treatise	and	reading	a	
few	cases.	Some	lawyers	do	legal	research	only	through	law	clerks	and	paralegals	who	are	




	 157.	 Schanck,	supra	note	132,	at	17.	Schanck	did	not	discuss	Delgado	and	Stefancic’s	1989	Stanford Law 
Review article,	which	may	not	have	been	available	at	the	time	he	wrote.
	 158.	 Id.	at	17–19.








¶50	 Jill	Anne	 Farmer’s	 1993	 article	 on	 poststructuralism	 and	 legal	 research	
discussed	 “the	 cultural	 determinants	 with	 which	 the	 user	 approaches	 informa-
tion,”162	citing	Berring,	Delgado	and	Stefancic,	and	others	for	their	comments	on	
the	influences	of	the	categories	of	the	West	digest	system,	other	standard	indexing	
tools	 in	 law,	 and	 the	 organizing	 structures	 of	 law	 libraries.163	 Farmer,	 however,	




by	 citations	 to	what	 came	before,	 the	 probability	 that	 one’s	 perspective	will	 be	
broadened	is	not	very	high.”166 While	true	in	all	disciplines,	these	patterns	may	be	
particularly	strong	in	law	because	of	such	factors	as	the	discipline’s	penchant	for	
detailed	citation	of	authorities	and	publishers’	 tendencies	 to	 reference	 their	own	
publications	and	services.167
Boundaries of the Universe
¶51	 In	 discussing	 the	 respective	 roles	 of	 primary	 and	 secondary	 sources	 in	 his	
response	 to	 Schanck,	Barkan	 harked	 back	 to	 Frederick	Hicks’s	 “revered”	 1933	
textbook,	which	defined	legal	research	as	“the	inquiry	and	investigation	necessary	
to	be	made	by	 legislators,	 judges,	 lawyers	 and	 legal	writers	 in	 the	performance	
of	 their	 functions.”168	As	Barkan	 put	 it,	 “[Hicks]	made	 the	 point	 of	 noting	 that	
	 159.	 Barkan,	Response to Schanck,	supra	note	133,	at	30.	
	 160.	 Id.
	 161.	 Id.	at	30	n.35.	Berring’s	later	articles	do	not	discuss	the	points	raised	by	Schanck.
	 162.	 Jill	Anne	Farmer,	A Poststructuralist Analysis of the Legal Research Process,	85	law libR. J. 391,	
396	 (1993).	 See	 also	Michael	Duggan	&	David	 Isenbergh,	Poststructuralism and the Brave New 






	 164.	 Richard	Delgado,	The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,	132	U. 
pa. l. Rev.	561	(1984).	Delgado	found	that	leading	law	review	articles	written	on	civil	rights	topics	
by	white	male	writers	only	“infrequently”	cited	minority	scholars.	Id.	at	563.
	 165.	 Fred	Shapiro,	The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale	Law	Journal,	100	yale l.J. 1449	(1991).
	 166.	 Farmer,	supra	note	162,	at	401.
	 167.	 Id.
	 168.	 Barkan,	Response to Schanck,	supra	note	133,	at	33	(quoting	hiCKs	(1933),	supra	note	39,	at	1).
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‘[a]s	here	used,	the	word	legal	is	not	restrictive	as	to	subject	matter,	but	descrip-
tive	of	 the	agents	and	the	purposes	of	 the	 inquiries	 involved.’”169	Because	of	 its	
breadth	and	 its	acknowledgment	of	 the	roles	of	both	secondary	 legal	authorities	
and	nonlegal	sources,	Hicks’s	definition	seems	to	have	assumed	that	legal	research	
encompasses	more	sources	of	information	than	those	traditionally	found	in	the	law	




¶52	 In	 their	 1997	 article	 “Legal	 Positivism	 as	 Legal	 Information,”	 Fred	
Schauer	 and	Virginia	Wise	 found	 it	 “intriguing”	 that	 “those	 scholars	who	 have	



















your	 own	 realistic	 evaluation	 of	 their	 persuasiveness.’”	 Barkan,	Response to Schanck,	 supra	 note	
133,	 at	 34	 (quoting	MaRJoRie diCK RoMbaUeR, legal pRobleM solving: analysis, ReseaRCh, 
and wRiting 211	(1983)).	He	also	noted	Rombauer’s	use	of	Karl	Llewellyn’s	statement	that	“[a]ny	
effort	at	limitation	to	‘legal’	literature	has	for	now	some	forty	years	been	growing	into	something	so	
arbitrary	and	inept	as	to	verge	on	farce.”	Id.	at	34	(quoting	KaRl n. llewellyn, the CoMMon law 
tRadition: deCiding appeals 234	(1960)).
	 171.	 Schauer	&	Wise,	Legal Positivism,	supra	note	78,	at	1095–96	(citing	works	by	Berring,	Katsh,	and	
Eugene	Volokh	as	examples).	But see, e.g.,	Katsh, eleCtRoniC Media,	supra	note	105,	at	223	(“If	
law	cannot	be	expected	to	possess	the	same	internal	organization	in	the	future,	neither	can	it	expect	
its	external	boundaries	to	remain	as	fixed	as	they	are	today.”);	Stefancic	&	Delgado,	supra	note	131,	
at	 854	 (pointing	out	 that	 law	 libraries	may	 serve	 as	gateways	 to	 “the	 literature	of	 other	 academic	
disciplines,	 statistical	data,	news	reports,	and	even	monographs”).	There	also	were	attempts	 in	 the	
legal	research	literature	to	introduce	lawyers	to	electronic	sources	for	nonlegal	information. See, e.g.,	
S.	Blair	Kauffman,	Electronic Databases in Legal Research: Beyond Lexis and Westlaw,	13	RUtgeRs 
CoMpUteR & teCh. l.J. 73	(1987).
	 172.	 Schauer	&	Wise,	Legal Positivism,	supra	note	78,	at	1096.
	 173.	 Id.	at	1102.
	 174.	 Id.	at	1102–03.
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¶53	In	1997,	 increasingly	more	nonlegal	 information	was	available	 to	 lawyers	




and	Wise	 concluded	 that	 “starting	 in	1991,	 there	has	been	a	 substantial	 and	con-
tinuing	 increase	 in	 the	Court’s	citation	of	non	 legal	sources.”176	This	was	perhaps	
enough	of	a	change	in	the	information	set	to	signal	both	a	shift	in	the	information	
boundaries	of	law	(something	Schauer	and	Wise	labeled	“the	delegalization	of	law”)	










	 178.	 Schauer	&	Wise,	Nonlegal Information,	supra	note	78.	Schauer	and	Wise	were	not	the	first	to	study	
the	citation	practices	of	the	federal	and	state	courts,	although	they	were	among	the	first	to	focus	on	
the	courts’	uses	of	nonlegal	sources.	Since	John	Henry	Merryman,	The Authority of Authority: What 





	 	 	 In	general,	those	citation	studies	that	have	looked	for	references	to	nonlegal	sources	in	state	court	
opinions	have	 found	 few.	See	A.	Michael	Beard, Citations to Authority by the Arkansas Appellate 
Courts, 1950–2000,	25	U. aRK. little RoCK l.Rev.	301,	327–28	(2003);	Lawrence	M.	Friedman	et	
al.,	State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation,	33	stan. l. Rev.	773,	817	(1981);	James	
Leonard,	An Analysis of Citations to Authority in Ohio Appellate Decisions Published in 1990,	86	
law libR. J.	129,	146	(1994);	William	H.	Manz,	The Citation Practices of the New York Court of 
Appeals, 1850–1993,	43	bUFF. l. Rev.	121,	145–46	(1995);	William	H.	Manz,	The Citation Practices 
of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update,	49	bUFF. l. Rev.	1273,	1289–90	(2001);	
Merryman,	supra at	670–72;	John	Henry	Merryman,	Toward A Theory of Citations: An Empirical 
Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970,	50	s. Cal. 
l. Rev.	 381,	 408	 n.22	 (1977).	See also	Dragomir	Cosanici	&	Chris	 Evan	Long,	Recent Citation 
Practices of the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals,	 legal ReFeRenCe 
seRviCes q.,	2005,	no.	1/2,	at	103;	Joseph	A.	Custer,	Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court 
and Kansas Court of Appeals,	Kan. J. l. & pUb. pol’y, Spring	1999,	at	126;	Paul	Hellyer,	Assessing 
the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research: A Study of California Supreme Court Opinions,	
97	law libR. J.	 285,	2005	law libR. J.	 16;	Fritz	Snyder,	The Citation Practices of the Montana 
Supreme Court,	57	Mont. l. Rev.	453	(1996).	
	 	 	 In	some	contrast	to	the	published	findings	regarding	state	reports,	Wes	Daniels’s	1983	study	of	U.S.	
Supreme	Court	opinions	suggested	slight,	but	increasing	citations	to	nonlegal	sources	for	the	years	he	
examined.	Wes	Daniels,	“Far Beyond the Law Reports”: Secondary Source Citations in United States 
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Continuing Influences
¶54	Berring’s	writings	 established	what	 is	 now	 the	 accepted	model	 for	 discuss-
ing	 legal	 information	 in	 the	United	States.	Although	 his	 own	most	 recent	writ-
ings	 focusing	on	 the	 influences	of	 legal	 information	were	published	 in	2000,179	
later	writers	have	continued	 to	discuss	changes	 in	 the	 formats	and	 structures	of	
legal	information	in	terms	of	their	impacts	on	West’s	print-based	systems,	and	to	
develop	themes	introduced	in	the	works	of	Berring	and	other	writers.180	
¶55	 Has	 the	 later	 literature	 improved	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 impacts	 of	
the	shift	 to	electronic	sources	of	 legal	 information	beyond	the	 insights	provided	
by	Berring	 and	 others?	 Some	 answers	 are	 provided	 in	 three	 thoughtful	 articles	
published	 in	 2002:	 Richard	 J.	 Ross’s	 “Communications	 Revolutions	 and	 Legal	
Culture:	An	Elusive	Relationship,”181	F.	Allan	Hanson’s	“From	Key	Numbers	 to	
Keywords:	 How	Automation	 Has	 Transformed	 the	 Law,”182	 and	 Paul	 Duguid’s	
“The	Social	Life	of	Legal	Information:	First	Impressions.”183	
¶56	 Richard	 Ross’s	 essay	 is	 a	 review	 both	 of	 Ethan	 Katsh’s	 books184	 and	









University	 of	Minnesota	Law	Library,	Berring	 returned	 briefly	 to	 the	 themes	 of	 his	 earlier	work.	
Robert	C.	Berring,	Deconstructing the Law Library: The Wisdom of Meredith Willson,	89	Minn. l. 
Rev. 1381,	1395–1402	(2005).
	 180.	 There	is	not	space	to	discuss	all	of	the	most	insightful	post-2000	literature.	Of	particular	note	(though	
not	discussed	here)	are	Paul	Douglas	Callister,	Law’s Box: Law, Jurisprudence and the Information 




The Ownership and Commodification of Legal Knowledge: Using Social Theory of the Information 
Age as a Tool for Policy Analysis,	30	Manitoba l.J. 417	(2004)	(examining	competing	models	for	
thinking	about	the	relationships	between	information	technology	and	social	and	economic	changes).
	 181.	 Ross,	supra	note	110.
	 182.	 Hanson,	Key Numbers to Keywords,	supra	note	2.	See	also	F.	Allan	Hanson,	From Classification to 
Indexing: How Automation Transforms the Way We Think,	18	soC. episteMology 333	(2004)	[here-
inafter	Hanson, Classification to Indexing].
	 183.	 Paul	Duguid,	The Social Life of Legal Information: First Impressions,	FiRst Monday,	Sept.	2002,	
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_9/duguid/index.html.	 Duguid	 claimed	 that	 his	 “only	 qualifica-
tion	for	writing	this	paper	may	be	my	complete	lack	of	qualifications,	for	my	dealings	with	the	law	
and	lawyers	have	been	few.”	Id.	at	n.1.
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¶57	Ross	briefly	summarized	the	common	story	told	by	Katsh	and	by	Collins	
and	Skover	regarding	the	impacts	of	print	on	the	development	of	the	law	and	the	














¶58	The	 bulk	 of	 the	 article	 critiques	 four	 “case	 studies”	 describing	 areas	 in	
which	Katsh	and	others	had	explored	the	impacts	of	media:	the	doctrine	of	prec-








¶59	 F.	Allan	 Hanson	 is	 an	 anthropologist,	 with	 research	 interests	 in	 index-
ing	 and	 classification.197	His	Law Library Journal	 article	 begins	with	 a	 nod	 to	















secondary	literature.	Hanson,	Key Numbers to Keywords,	supra	note	2,	at	564,	¶	3.
	 198.	 Id.	at	563–64	(citing	Bast	&	Pyle,	supra	note	2,	at	286–88,	¶¶	5–13).














ing	 clear	 the	 differences	 between	 indexing	 and	 classification,203	 a	 distinction	
that	 is	 perhaps	not	made	as	 consistently	 as	 it	might	be	 in	 the	 legal	 information	
literature.204	 Hanson	 describes	 classification	 as	 the	 organization	 of	 “a	 body	 of	
information	according	 to	some	conceptual	scheme.	 .	 .	 .	 [T]he	distinctive	feature	




¶61	 In	 contrast,	 an	 index	 is	 a	 finding	 device	 that	 connects	 a	 symbol	 for	 a	
topic	 (usually	 a	word	or	 a	phrase)	with	 information	 stored	 in	 a	database	 (print,	
electronic,	or	in	“human	memory”).	Most	importantly,	unlike	classification,	“[i]n	
its	pure	form,	indexing	conveys	nothing	about	relationships	that	may	exist	among	
different	 topics.”206	 Prior	 to	 automation,	 both	 classifications	 and	 indexes	 were	
constructed	by	human	intelligence	to	create	tools,	such	as	classified	indexes	like	
the	West	 Key	 Number	 System,	 which	 serves	 “both	 the	 classification	 function	








	 203.	 Id.	at	573–75,	¶¶	29–33.	See also Hanson, Classification to Indexing,	supra	note	182,	at	334–36.
	 204.	 See,	 e.g.,	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 West	 Digest	 System	 in	 Barbara	 Bintliff,	 From Creativity to 





	 205.	 Hanson,	Key Numbers to Keywords,	supra	note	2,	at	574,	¶	30.
	 206.	 Id.,	¶	31.
















categories	 that	also	serve	as	devices	for	finding	 legal	 information	[and	because]	






away	 from	modernity	 toward	a	“positive	version	of	postmodernity,	grounded	 in	
habitual	behavior	that	features	greater	flexibility	and	creativity.”214
¶63	 Paul	 Duguid’s	 article,	 titled	 with	 a	 nod	 to	 his	 well-regarded	 book	The 
Social Life of Information (coauthored	with	John	Seely	Brown),215	focuses	on	the	
impacts	of	 technology	on	institutions	of	 legal	education:	 the	 law	school	and	the	
library.	Duguid’s	article	is	important	within	the	legal	information	literature	for	its	
emphasis	on	 the	concepts	of	“professional	community”	and	“practice”—matters	
that	he	 found	 to	be	“little	more	 than	commonplaces	 for	most	 lawyers	 .	 .	 .	 [but]	
not,	however,	quite	commonplace	in	discussions	of	legal	education	and	its	trans-











	 215.	 John seely bRown & paUl dUgUid, the soCial liFe oF inFoRMation	(2000).
	 216.	 Duguid,	supra	note	183.
	 217.	 Id.




¶64	 Noting	 that	 “digital	 enthusiasts”	 generally	 avoid	 discussing	 matters	 of	
interpretation	of	 texts	 in	 favor	of	discussing	access,	 seeing	“[i]nterpretation	and	
meaning	 .	 .	 .	 as	 somehow	 unproblematic,	 self-evident,	 or	 transparent,”	 Duguid	








munities,	Duguid	was	clear	 in	his	assertion	that	 the	early	 twenty-first	century	is	
“a	period	in	which	the	conventions	of	interpretation	and	meaning	are	significantly	
underdetermined.	 .	 .	 .	 [A]	 period	 of	 diverging	 strategies,	 transient	 conventions,	
conflicting	 interests,	 community	 formation,	 dissolution,	 and	 reformation,	 and	
constant,	implicit	social	negotiation.”221	Duguid	compliments	Berring	for	detect-
ing	 these	“symptoms,”	but	counters	Berring’s	 suggestion	 that	 individual	author-
ity	 (“a	 new	Blackstone”)	will	 be	 needed	 to	 develop	 new	 sources	 of	 [cognitive]	
authority,222	with	an	argument	 that	“forms	of	communal	authority	[developed	in	
such	places	as	libraries]	will	be	more	important.	It	is	interpretive	communities	that	









	 219.	 Id.	(quoting	Berring,	Cognitive Authority,	supra	note	1,	at	1688).
	 220.	 Id.	
	 221.	 Id.	 (citing	adRian Johns, the natURe oF the booK: pRint and Knowledge in the MaKing	
(1998)).
	 222.	 Id.	(citing	Berring,	Thinkable Thoughts,	supra	note	3	at	315,	318).
	 223.	 Id.	
	 224.	 By	 2002,	 some	writers	 discussed	 the	 universe	 of	 thinkable	 thoughts	 without	 commenting	 on	 the	
origins	of	the	concept	or	referring	to	Berring	or	other	writers.	See	Scott	Matheson,	Searching Case 
Digests in Print or Online: How to Find the “Thinkable Thoughts,” 11	peRspeCtives: teaChing 
legal Res. & wRiting 19,	19	(2002)	(suggesting	without	reference	that	the	key	number	system	itself	
is	“sometimes	called	the	‘universe	of	thinkable	thoughts’”).	









been	as	 influential	as	 suggested	 in	Berring’s	work.	 In	1994,	Nazareth	Pantaloni	
expressed	cautions	about	putting	 too	much	stock	 into	 the	power	of	 indexes	and	
digests	to	mold	the	law,229	anticipating	some	of	the	broader	criticisms	of	the	uni-
versalist	 approaches	 of	 the	 “legal	McLuhanites”	 that	Richard	Ross	would	 offer	
in	 2002.230	 The	 most	 sustained	 criticisms	 were	 perhaps	 those	 offered	 by	 Peter	
Schanck	 in	 his	 response	 to	 Barkan’s	 Critical	 Legal	 Studies	 article	 in	 1990.	As	
noted	above,	Schanck	argued	that	Barkan’s	(and	Berring’s)	ideas	about	the	impacts	
of	digests	and	other	 tools	on	 lawyers’	 thinking	were	based	on	a	wrong	sense	of	
how	attorneys	actually	conduct	research.	Schanck	questioned	whether,	given	his	
own	 sense	of	 how	 the	 tools	were	used	 in	practice,	 they	 could	have	 the	broader	
impacts	claimed	for	them.231
¶67	 Schanck’s	 comments	 suggest	 at	 least	 that	 more	 research	 is	 needed	 to	
demonstrate	 the	connections	between	the	forms	and	structures	of	 legal	 informa-
	 225.	 See, e.g.,	James	G.	Milles,	Leaky Boundaries and the Decline of the Autonomous Law School Library,	




	 226.	 See, e.g.,	Danner,	supra note	72,	at	154	(citing	Berring,	Form Molds Substance,	supra	note	9,	at	15,	
for	the	notion	“that	the	forms	in	which	legal	information	is	published	and	distributed	can	be	influen-
tial	in	the	development	of	legal	knowledge”).
	 227.	 See, e.g.,	Amanda	 Barratt,	New Rights—New Laws: South African Legal Literature in a Time of 






indexing	systems?”	Pantaloni,	supra	note	110,	at	699	(citing	Nancy	C.	Carter,	AALL Research Agenda 
and Grants Program,	aall newsl.,	Oct	1993,	at	92,	92).	With	the	addition	of	the	question	“Is	elec-
tronic	legal	research	changing	the	actual	law?”,	the	topic	remains	on	the	revised	(and	current)	AALL	
research	 agenda.	Am.	Ass’n	 of	 Law	Libraries,	AALL	Research	Agenda	 [§]	 IV.C	 (Nov.	 4,	 2000),	
reprinted in	aM. ass’n oF law libRaRies, aall diReCtoRy and handbooK	2006–2007,	at	517,	
519	(46th	ed.	2006),	available at	http://www.aallnet.org/committee/research/agenda.asp.
	 229. See supra	¶	35.




	 231.	 See supra	¶¶	47–48.






¶68	The	West	Digest	System	classifies	 law	 into	 seven	major	 topics,	which	
then	break	down	hierarchically	into	other	topics	and	key	numbers.	But,	how	do	
the	 relationships	 among	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 system	make	 themselves	 known	
to	 lawyers	 as	 they	 conduct	 their	 research	 in	 practice?	At	 what	 levels	 are	 the	
relationships	 influential?	 Although	West	 classifies	 cases	 under	 the	 four-hun-
dred-plus	 topics	of	 its	classification	system,	 in	 its	print	digests	 (as	 in	 those	of	
other	 publishers	 and	 in	 other	 comprehensive	 legal	 research	 tools),	 the	 topics	
are	 presented	 to	 researchers	 in	 alphabetical	 order	 by	 topic	 name.	As	 Hanson	
suggests,	 the	 meaningful	 relationships	 inherent	 in	 classification	 are	 lost	 in	
alphabetical	 arrangement.233	Thus,	 in	 practical	 application,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 how	
a	researcher	would	 learn	 that	 the	 topic	“Licenses”	fell	 into	 the	overall	scheme	




between	 “Libel	 and	 Slander”	 and	 “Liens,”	 which	 tells	 the	 researcher	 nothing	






suggest	 that	 Schanck’s	 questions	 about	 how	 this	 happens	 are	worthy	 of	more	
exploration	than	they	have	received.235
	 232.	 See supra	¶	19.








themselves.”	R.A.	Daly,	The Descriptive Word,	3	aM. l. sCh. Rev.	79,	79	(1912).	
	 235.	 Do	we	know	more	about	how	lawyers	conduct	research	than	the	little	that	Morris	Cohen	suggested	
we	did	 in	1969?	Morris	L.	Cohen,	Research Habits of Lawyers, 9	 JURiMetRiCs J.183,	183	 (1969)	
(“[W]e	know	a	great	deal	about	 the	materials	of	 legal	 research	 .	 .	 .,	but	almost	nothing	about	 the	
actual	procedures	used	by	lawyers	in	their	search	into	the	law.”).	Cohen	referred	to	“the	books	of	the	
law,”	but	the	point	is	probably	true	today	regarding	computer-based	research	as	well.	See, e.g.,	Eric	
Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism,	8	yale J. l & teCh. 
188,	189	(2006)	(describing	how,	despite	their	“veneer	of	objectivity	and	credibility	[search	engines]	
systematically	favor	certain	types	of	content	over	others.”).


















and	other	 resources	 in	print	 form239	may	have	curtailed	 the	usefulness	of	print-
based	models	for	examining	the	influences	of	legal	information,	it	is	important	to	
consider	what	approaches	or	models	will	be	most	useful	for	exploring	the	future	
roles	 and	 influences	 of	 legal	 information.	 The	 universe	 of	 thinkable	 thoughts	




	 236.	 See	 Emily	 Sherwin,	 Legal	 Taxonomy	 16–23	 (Cornell	 Legal	 Studies	 Research	 Paper	 No.	 06-020,	
2006),	available at	http://ssrn.com/abstract=925129	(discussing	purposes	of	classification).	She	notes	
that	 there	 are	 “two	 likely	purposes	 .	 .	 .:	 guiding	 the	outcomes	of	 adjudication	and	contributing	 to	
knowledge	of	and	discourse	about	the	law.”	Id.	at	16.
	 237.	 Some	of	the	historical	 literature	from	the	discussions	of	classification	is	 listed	in	Jay	M.	Feinman,	
The Jurisprudence of Classification,	 41	stan. l. Rev.	 661,	663	n.4	 (1989).	On	 the	Restatements,	
see	N.E.H.	Hull,	Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law 







.	 .	 .	Faculty,	attorneys,	and	 law	students	voted	with	 their	 feet,	and	 their	 feet	 led	 them	 to	 the	com-
puter	terminal.”);	Judy	Meadows	&	Kay	Todd,	Our Question: Is the Use of Digests Changing?	13	











¶71	 It	will	 also	be	necessary	 to	 expand	our	 study	of	 the	 influences	of	 legal	
information	to	systems	outside	the	United	States	and	to	develop	approaches	that	












availability	 for	discussion	 and	analysis	 inform	 the	discourse	of	 the	professional	
community?	






in	scope.	For	 law	librarians,	 it	 is	 the	 locus	of	 the	best	of	our	own	literature	and	
professional	knowledge.
	 241.	 See	Michael	W.	Carroll,	The Movement for Open Access Law,	10	lewis & ClaRK l. Rev. 741	(2006)	
(arguing	for	the	benefits	of	providing	open	access	to	legal	scholarship).
	 242.	 See supra	text	accompanying	notes	177–78.
	 243.	 Martin	 Chanock,	 Introduction,	 in	 sally FalK MooRe, law as pRoCess: an anthRopologiCal 
appRoaCh,	 at	 xxvii–xxviii	 (2d	 ed.	 2000).	 See	 also	 John M. Conley & williaM o’ baRR, JUst 
woRds: law, langUage, and poweR 135–37	 (1998)	 (calling	 for	 “a	 new	 discourse-based	 legal	
anthropology”).
	 244.	 bRown & dUgUid,	supra	note	215,	at	189.	
	 245.	 Id.	at	190.	
	 246.	 See generally id.	at	173–90;	Duguid,	supra	note	183.	For	discussion	of	the	varieties	of	legal	discourse,	
see	MaRtin ChanoCK, the MaKing oF soUth aFRiCan legal CUltURe 1902–1936,	at	19–26	(2001); 
John M. Conley & williaM M. o’baRR, RUles veRsUs Relationships: the ethnogRaphy oF 
legal disCoURse 2	(1990).
